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Operation Market Garden (September 17, 1944–September 25, 1944) was an Allied military operation fought in the Netherlands and Germany in World War II. It made large-scale use of airborne forces. Its tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German-occupied Netherlands to allow rapid advance by armored units. The strategic purpose was to allow an Allied crossing of the Rhine river, the last major natural barrier to an advance into Germany. The planned rapid advance from the Dutch-Belgian border into northern Germany, across the Maas (Meuse) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower Rhine), would have outflanked the Siegfried Line and made possible an encirclement of the Ruhr Area, Germany's industrial heartland.
Overview
The operation was initially successful with the capture of the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on September 20, but it was a failure overall since the planned Allied advance across the Rhine at Arnhem had to be abandoned. The British 1st Airborne Division did not secure the bridge at Arnhem, and although they managed to hold out near the bridge far longer than planned, the British XXX Corps failed to relieve them. The Rhine remained a barrier to the Allied advance until the offensives at Remagen, Oppenheim, Rees and Wesel in March 1945. Due to the Allied defeat at Arnhem, the north of the Netherlands could not be liberated before winter and the Hongerwinter ('Hungerwinter') took tens of thousands of lives, particularly in the cities of the Randstad area.
Background
After major defeats in Normandy in July to August 1944, remnants of German forces withdrew across the Low Countries and eastern France towards the German border by the end of August. In the north, the British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was advancing on a line running from Antwerp to the northern border of Belgium. The First Canadian Army was just finishing their own offensive northward along the coast and were too fatigued to take part in major actions. To their south, the U.S. 12th Army Group under General Omar Bradley was nearing the German border and had been ordered to orient on the Aachen gap with the U.S. First Army. In the south, the U.S. 6th Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers was advancing towards Germany after their landings in southern France.
Logistical problems
 |
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On 4 September 1944 supply shortages halted the Allied advance. Supply sources were limited to the shallow docks built on the original invasion beaches and the nearby deepwater port of Cherbourg at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula. The massive port of Antwerp lay intact in British hands, but the Scheldt estuary leading to it was still under German control. Other important ports on the English Channel coast such as Dunkirk remained in German hands until May 1945. Although over-the-beach supply operations outperformed expectations and enough supplies were present on the continent to support Allied operations, a shortage of transport to move these supplies forward created a bottleneck. At the beginning of September, Cherbourg had 70,000 tons of stockpiled supplies but no transport to move them. Regional railway transport was non-existent because of the pre-invasion airstrikes; train movement out of Normandy did not resume until August 30 and was very limited. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 1,400 British three-ton trucks were found to be useless because of faulty pistons in their engines — they could have moved 800 tons per day, enough for two divisions. In an attempt to address this acute shortage of transport, three newly-arrived U.S. infantry divisions (the 26th, 95th, and 104th) were stripped of their trucks in order to supply Montgomery's British 21st Army Group to allow Operation Market Garden to proceed. Similarly, the heavy artillery units of General Omar Bradley's US 12th Army Group were left west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Organization of the Red Ball Express did much to lessen the impact of the transport shortage, but this ad hoc operation could not solve the problem.
Competing solutions
Following the British and Canadian breakout from Caen and the closure of the Falaise pocket, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, favoured a broad advance eastwards to the Rhine across a wide front, combined with capture and clearance of the Channel ports and Antwerp.5page # needed This strategy was contested by the field commanders, especially Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery who commanded the British 21st Army Group in the north, and General George Patton, commander of the US 3rd Army in the south. Both favored rapid, concentrated thrusts across the Rhine in their own sectors. With the supply situation deteriorating in early September, a broad advance became impossible; there were not enough supplies moving forward to keep all of the armies in "combat supply".
Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, commander of the XXX Corps that captured Antwerp, explained in his autobiography "A Full Life" how the Allies were crippled by a strategic error in the first days of September. It was assumed that the port of Antwerp would become usable as soon as the city had been captured; not one Allied commander realised that the Scheldt estuary leading to the port was mined and that the Germans had dug in on its banks, so preventing use of the port. Lieutenant-General Horrocks states that the correct action would have been to bypass Antwerp on 3–4 September and drive 24 kilometres (15 mi) north-west to Woensdrecht, so cutting off the Beveland isthmus, trapping the German 15th Army and allowing the Scheldt to be cleared for Allied shipping. The Allied failure to do this on 4 September allowed the Germans a two week respite, during which over 60,000 soldiers of the German 15th Army withdrew from Flanders and escaped across the Beveland isthmus into the Netherlands.6 The continued closure of the Scheldt hugely exacerbated the Allies' supply problem.
Most Allied commanders favored pursuit of the seemingly shattered German armies. Omar Bradley (as well as his subordinate George S. Patton) and Montgomery both requested priority on supplies in order to cross the River Rhine in a single decisive thrust, instead of clearing the Scheldt to open the port of Antwerp. Bradley and Patton favoured an attack east to take the city of Metz and into the industrial area of the Saarland, requiring passage of the Siegfried Line to the heavily defended Rhine. Bradley suggested that Allied air transport should continue to be used to move supplies to the front, able to keep the front lines moving regardless of the existing problems to the rear. Bradley was indulgent with respect to Patton's requests, interpreting Eisenhower's orders in a manner that gave Patton free rein. On 5 September Bradley allowed Patton's US 3rd Army to advance to the Moselle, a move that stretched the US 1st Army, which was trying to cover the gap between Montgomery's 21st Army Group and the US 3rd Army.7
Montgomery initially suggested Operation Comet, a limited airborne coup de main to seize the bridge in Arnhem on September 7, but weather postponements and a fluid enemy situation made it evident that Arnhem was too distant a target for an unsupported airborne attack. Comet was replaced by a more ambitious plan to bypass the Siegfried Line, cross the Rhine with large-scale forces, and trap the German 15th Army between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer: Operation Market Garden. On 10 September Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army under Montgomery, told Montgomery that he had doubts about this plan, and that he instead favored a strike north-eastwards between the Reichswald and the Ruhr to Wesel. Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something must be done to neutralise the V-2 launch sites around the Hague, which were bombarding London and Antwerp, and that the plan must therefore proceed.8 Furthermore, operations would be within range of aircraft flying from English bases, it would circumvent the strong defences of the Siegfried Line by hooking around its northern end, and a deep northern penetration would take the Germans by surprise. However, the plan had several problems. It required the Second Army to drive northwards through terrain with numerous water obstacles to cross, and General Bradley pointed out that it would open a dangerous gap to the south between the 21st Army Group and the US 1st Army. Additionally, it entailed an armored advance up a single narrow road, built like a causeway with low-lying polder on both sides, restricting supply lines and the ability to use numerical strength to full advantage.9page # needed
After meeting Lieutenant-General Dempsey, Montgomery flew to Brussels that afternoon (10 September) to meet Eisenhower. Supply difficulties were so severe that tank transporters were being used to ferry parts of portable runways and basic supplies. Second Army did not even have use of its heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Montgomery requested Eisenhower's Chief Administrative Officer to leave the meeting, but insisted on his own remaining. He then tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of himcitation needed, and argued for a concentrated northern thrust, simultaneously demanding priority of supply. Eisenhower, convinced that German forces faced imminent collapse, was equally adamant that advance on a broad front was correct. However, he consented to Operation Market Garden, giving it "limited priority" in terms of supplies, but insisted that he could not reduce support for the advance to the Saar.10verification needed In vain, Montgomery complained about this to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. For their part, the American commanders were irritated by the priority accorded to the 21st Army Group.citation needed
Meanwhile General Patton had advanced so far that it became clear to Lieutenant-General Dempsey that the US 1st Army would not be able to cover the gap once Market Garden was launched. Hence the British VIII Corps would have to be detached from the main striking force to cover the south-eastern flank. There was not enough transport immediately available to move VIII Corps, necessitating a four day delay until 21 September. On 11 September Montgomery brought this argument to bear on Eisenhower, and on 12 September the Americans promised to give the British many trucks and 1,000 tons of their own supplies each day. Both Montgomery and Bradley assumed that this meant that Eisenhower had accepted Montgomery's demand for a single concentrated, northern thrust to Berlin.citation needed
General Bradley thought that the advance of the US 3rd Army under General Patton was thus at risk, and warned Patton. Patton decided to advance immediately beyond the Moselle and become so engaged with the enemy that the fight could not be broken off, forcing supplies to be diverted south. Patton was told to conduct "a continuous reconnaissance", it being understood that this meant "unrelenting attack". Indeed, the US 12th Army Group's supplies, which Eisenhower had intended to divert to Montgomery, continued to be supplied to the US 1st Army and Patton's 3rd Army. Thus the supply situation leading up to Operation Market Garden was extraordinarily difficult.citation needed
Eisenhower's decision to launch Market Garden was mostly influenced by his desire to keep the retreating Germans under pressure. However, General Eisenhower was also under pressure from the U.S. to use the Airborne Army as soon as possible. After Normandy the airborne forces had been withdrawn to reform in England, forming the First Allied Airborne Army of two British and three U.S. airborne divisions, and a Polish brigade. After Normandy, plans for 18 airborne operations had been drafted, but then cancelled at short notice, mostly when Allied ground forces overran the intended drop zones.11verification neededpage # needed
Plan
- Further information: Operation Market Garden order of battle
The plan of action consisted of two operations:
- MARKET: airborne forces of General Brereton's the First Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges and other terrain, under tactical command of Lieutenant-General Browning, and
- GARDEN: ground forces of the Second Army to move north spearheaded by XXX Corps under Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks.
Terrain considerations
There were eight major water obstacles between the XXX Corps jumping-off point and the objective of the north bank of the Rhine, including several major rivers and three canals. Plans were made to seize bridges across all these obstacles nearly simultaneously. Although the smaller canals and rivers could be temporarily bridged by engineers of XXX Corps if the existing permanent bridges could not be seized, the larger rivers (the Waal at Nijmegen and the Rhine at Arnhem) could not be bridged by XXX Corps.
Highway 69 (later nicknamed "Hell's Highway") leading through the planned route was two lanes wide, generally raised above the surrounding flat terrain of polder. The ground on either side of the highway was too soft to support tactical vehicle movement.
A single 100 meter (100 yards) high hill, the Groesbeek ridge, lay in the 82nd Airborne's zone. Seizure and defence of this hill was considered vital to holding the highway bridges.
Market
Market would employ three of the five divisions of the First Allied Airborne Army. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division, under Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, would drop in two locations just north of XXX Corps to take the bridges northwest of Eindhoven at Son and Veghel. The 82nd Airborne Division, under Brigadier General James M. Gavin, would drop northeast of them to take the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen, and the British 1st Airborne Division, under Major-General Roy Urquhart, and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade would drop at the extreme north end of the route, to take the road bridge at Arnhem and rail bridge at Oosterbeek.
The First Allied Airborne Army had been created on August 16 as the end result of British requests for a coordinated headquarters for airborne operations, a concept approved by General Eisenhower on June 20. The British had strongly hinted that a British officer—Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning in particular—be appointed its commander. Since the bulk of both troops and aircraft were American, however, a USAAF officer, Major General Lewis H. Brereton, was named by Eisenhower on July 16 and appointed by SHAEF on August 2. Brereton had no experience in airborne operations but had extensive command experience at the air force level in several theatres, most recently as commander of Ninth Air Force, which gave him a working knowledge of the operations of IX Troop Carrier Command.12
Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering over 34,600 men of the 101st, 82nd, 1st Airborne Divisions and the Polish Brigade. 14,589 troops were landed by glider and 20,011 by parachute. Gliders also brought in 1,736 vehicles and 263 artillery pieces. 3,342 tons of ammunition and other supplies were brought in by glider and parachute drop.13
To deliver its 36 battalions of airborne infantry and their support troops to the continent, the First Allied Airborne Army had under its operational control the 14 groups of IX Troop Carrier Command,1415 and after September 11, the 16 squadrons of both 38 Group (an organization of converted bombers providing support to resistance groups) and a transport formation, 46 Group.16
The combined force had available 1,438 C-47/Dakota transports (1,274 USAAF and 164 RAF) and 321 converted RAF bombers. The Allied glider force had been rebuilt after Normandy until by September 16 it numbered 2,160 CG-4A Waco gliders, 916 Airspeed Horsas (812 RAF and 104 US Army), and 64 General Aircraft Hamilcars. However the U.S. had only 2,060 glider pilots available, so that none of its gliders would have a co-pilot but would instead carry an extra passenger.17
Because the C-47s served as both paratrooper transports and glider tugs, and because IX Troop Carrier Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force could deliver only 60% of the ground forces in a single lift. This limitation was the primary factor in the decision to split the troop lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations).18
Because September 17 was on a dark moon, and in the days following it, the new moon did not rise until dawn, the drops had to be made by daylight. (Airborne doctrine prohibited large scale operations in the absence of all light.) The risk of Luftwaffe interception was judged small, given the crushing air superiority of Allied fighters, but strong concerns existed about the increasing number of flak units in the Netherlands, especially around Arnhem. General Brereton's experience with tactical air operations judged that flak suppression would be sufficient to permit the troop carriers to operate without prohibitive loss. Further, the invasion of Southern France had demonstrated that large scale daylight airborne operations were feasible.19
Daylight operations, in contrast to those in Sicily and Normandy, would have much greater navigational accuracy and time-compression of succeeding waves of aircraft, tripling the number of troops that could be delivered per hour. The time required to assemble airborne units on the drop zone after landing would be reduced by two-thirds.20
Garden
Garden consisted primarily of XXX Corps and was initially spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division, with the 43rd Wessex and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Divisions in reserve. They were expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st Airborne Division's area on the launch day, the 82nd's by the second day and the 1st's by the fourth day at the latest. They would also deliver several additional infantry divisions to take over the defensive operations from the airborne troops, freeing them for other operations as soon as possible.
Four days was a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupported. In addition the Allied paratroopers lacked adequate anti-tank weapons. Even so, before Operation Market Garden started it seemed to the Allied high command that the German resistance had broken. Most of the German 15th Army in the area appeared to be fleeing from the Canadians and they were known to have no Panzergruppen. It was thought that XXX Corps would face limited resistance on their route up highway 69 and little armour. Meanwhile, the German defenders would be spread out over 100 km (60 miles) trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the Second Army in the south to Arnhem in the north. The plan also bore a resemblance to a similar operation in the Battle of Sicily which was successfully concluded, though conducted on a smaller scale. That earlier operation had also been approved by General Montgomery and had been considered vital to the success of Allied strategic plans.21
German forces
The rout of the German forces in July and August led the Allies to believe that the German army was a spent force unable to reconstitute its shattered units, but all was not what it seemed. The failure of the 21st Army Group to clear or cut off the Scheldt from the mainland allowed the German 15th Army (previously stuck in Pas de Calais waiting for an Allied invasion that never came) to ferry 86,000 men and 600 artillery pieces back into the mainland of the Netherlands, into the path of the planned attack.
The arrival of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt as Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief West in early September also helped stabilize the German front. Rundstedt, who replaced Field Marshal Walter Model, was generally detested by Hitler but well-respected by his troops, whom he had back in fighting condition within the week. Rundstedt immediately began to plan a defence against what Wehrmacht intelligence said were 60 Allied divisions at full strengthcitation needed, however Eisenhower had only 49 divisions.citation needed
Colonel General Kurt Student, the Wehrmacht's airborne pioneer, was put in command of what was euphemistically called the 'First Parachute Army'. The 3,000 paratroopers, scattered across the Reich, were likely the only combat-ready reserve forces in Germany at the time22. When these troops reached the Albert Canal, a Belgian waterway near the Dutch border which stood in the path of the Allied advance towards Berlin, they were dismayed to realise that at the canal Field-Marshal Model's "New German Line" was virtually non-existent, lacking any trenches or fortifications. Student's men "frantically" began preparing a defence along the southern edge of the canal, placing demolition charges to destroy the bridges that would aid the Allied march towards Berlin. Though stymied by the superior natural inclination of the northern side, Student later marvelled in his memoirs at the speed and precision with which the paratroopers worked.
Lieutenant General Kurt Chill, commanding the shattered 85th Division, established 'reception stations' at key bridge crossings in the Netherlands. Chill's actions gathered a miscellany of troops from various broken units into a semblance of military order, allowing Student to organize a defensive line. The German 719th Infantry Division was added to this force.
A coincidence had resulted in German Panzer forces being sent to the Arnhem area on 4 September. Rundstedt and his generals had agreed that Eisenhower would favour Patton in the anticipated offensive. Accordingly, in one of his final orders as Commander-in-Chief West, Model had ordered the II SS Panzer Corps, including the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Wilhelm Bittrich, to rest and refit in a "safe" area. The place chosen happened to be the area around Arnhem with the 9th SS scattered in various towns and villages to the north of the city and the 10th SS stationed 15 km (9 miles) further to the east.
Both SS divisions were very weak. Their combined strength amounted to no more than 7,000 men, enough for approximately one division. They retained few heavy weapons following the retreat from Normandy. On the eve of the battle, the 9th SS Panzer regiment had no tanks, the 9th SS Artillery regiment based in Dieren had no guns, and neither the 19th nor 20th SS Panzer Grenadier regiments based in Zutphen and Rheden respectively, had any heavy weapons. Nevertheless the fortuitous selection of Arnhem as a rest area meant that there were an additional 3,000 combat-ready troops available to fight the British airborne drop and at least a few serviceable tanks, armoured cars, and assault guns.
Problems
Several reports about the German movements by the Dutch resistance had reached Allied command by September 10, including identification of German armour units. Although planning was in its later stages, SHAEF Chief of Staff General Walter Bedell Smith flew to 21st Army Group headquarters to suggest several possible changes in the plan which Montgomery was unable or unwilling to institute. When an aerial reconnaissance flight returned with pictures clearly showing German tanks only 15km (9 miles) from the British drop zones, they were dismissed by Montgomery, and indeed the Field Marshal ridiculed Bedell-Smith's doubts about the threat they posed 23 to the airborne assault.
IX Troop Carrier Command's transport aircraft had both to tow gliders and drop paratroopers, duties that could not be performed simultaneously. Although every division commander requested two drops the first day, Brereton's staff scheduled only one lift based on the need to prepare for the first drop by bombarding German flak positions for half a day, and a weather forecast on the afternoon of September 16, (which soon proved erroneous), that the area would have clear conditions for four days, so allowing drops on these days.24
The first day's lift involved all the U.S. parachute regiments but only half the British parachute troops, none of the Polish, and only three battalions of glider troops. Virtually no combat support units were delivered on D-day. A precarious timetable at the mercy of the weather resulted in the 101st Airborne Division being without its artillery for two days, the 82nd Airborne its artillery for a day and its glider infantry regiment for four days, and the British 1st Airborne division its fourth brigade until the fifth day. The longer the time required to complete the air drops, the longer each division had to devote forces to defending the drop and landing zones, weakening their offensive power.
Drop Zone selection was poor, particularly at Arnhem. The RAF coordinator refused to drop near the town on the north side of the target bridge because of flak guns at Deelen. Another suitable drop zone just to the south of the bridge was rejected because it was thought to be too marshy for landing gliders containing the force's heavier equipment. The inexperienced airborne commanders deferred to the RAF's concerns, and thus the three principal landing and drop zones were 8-10 km (5-6 miles) from the bridge, with the fourth being 13 km (8 miles) away.25page # needed
Since the division would arrive over two days, the forces landing on the first day would have to take the bridge while simultaneously holding the drop zones, ensuring the force would be divided for over 24 hours. Realizing the seriousness of the problem, the plan was then hastily changed to use a small force of machine-gun equipped jeeps to seize the bridge in a coup de main with three battalions following on foot. A fourth battalion would hold the drop zones with the glider pilots until the final two lifts arrived.
After one week preparations were declared complete; by comparison the planning and training for the airborne drops at Sicily and Normandy had taken months. One United States Air Force historian noted that Market was the only large airborne operation of World War II in which the USAAF "had no training program, no rehearsals, almost no exercises, and a...low level of tactical training."26
Planning tasks were done badly or not at all. Because it placed reinforcement and resupply of ground forces at the mercy of the weather, the decision to make only one drop per aircraft on September 17 was "disastrous" in the words of the United States Army's historical study of the operation. Communications planning was poor, and the 1st Airborne Division would be out of touch with most other headquarters for most of the battle. No arrangements were made for close air support. The drops were scheduled to occur from south to north to aid the ground-based northward advance of XXX Corps from the Belgian border; this gave the Germans early warning of possible operations to seize bridges across the Waal and Rhine, critically reducing the time available to the northernmost Allied airborne units at Arnhem to capture the Rhine bridge before they would be attacked.
Gavin, commanding the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, was skeptical of the plan. In his diary he wrote, "It looks very rough. If I get through this one I will be very lucky." He was also highly critical of Browning, writing that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgment that comes from a proper troop experience... his staff was superficial... Why the British units fumble along... becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way."27
Battle
Day 1: Sunday, 17 September 1944
Early successes
Operation Market Garden opened with Allied success all around. In the first landing, almost all troops arrived on top of their drop zones without incident. In the 82nd Airborne Division, 89% of troops landed on or within 1,000 meters (1000 yards) of their correct drop zones, and 84% of gliders landed on or within 1,000 meters (1,000 yards) of their landing zones. This contrasted with previous operations where night drops had resulted in units being scattered by up to 19 km (12 miles). Losses to enemy aircraft and flak were light; German flak was described in reports as "heavy but inaccurate".
In the south the 101st met little resistance and captured four of five bridges. The bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with a German Flak 88mm Anti-aircraft gun and a machine gun. Later that day several small attacks by the German 59th Infantry Division (a 15th Army unit that had escaped across the South Beveland isthmus because of the failure of XXX Corps to seal it off) were beaten off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.
To their north the 82nd arrived, and the small group dropped near Grave took the bridge in a rush. They also succeeded in capturing one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the lock-bridge at Heumen. The main effort of the 82nd was to seize the Groesbeek Heights and set up a blocking position there, to prevent a German armour attack out of the nearby Reichswald (a forest in Germany, near the border) and to deny the Heights to German artillery observers. Both Gavin and Browning felt this must be the Division's priority. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was tasked with taking the 600 meters (600 yards) long Nijmegen highway bridge if possible, but because of miscommunication they did not start until late in the day. Had they attacked earlier they would have faced only a dozen Germans. By the time the 508th attacked, troops of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion were arriving. The attack was stopped, leaving the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.
This was vital. Unlike some of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals that could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine that could not be bridged easily. If either of the Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held, the advance of XXX Corps would be blocked and Operation Market Garden would fail.
British landings
The 1st Airborne Division landed without major incident, but problems associated with the poor plan began almost immediately. Only half of the Division arrived with the First Lift, and only half of these, the 1st Parachute Brigade, could advance on the bridge. The remaining troops had to defend the drop zones overnight awaiting the arrival of the Second Lift on the following day. Thus the Division's primary objective had to be tackled by less than a half brigade. While the paratroopers marched eastwards to Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Squadron was to race to the bridge in their jeeps and hold it until the rest of the Brigade arrived. The unit set off to the bridge late, and having travelled only a short distance the vanguard was halted by a strong German defensive position; the squadron could make no further progress.
This had grave consequences. Five hours after the initial landing, feeling that the British were tied down in Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 9th Waffen-SS Panzer Division was able to cross the Arnhem bridge and drive to Nijmegen and the bridge over the Waal branch of the Rhine. No British airborne unit was at this bridge.
Two of the three battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade were slowed down by small German units of a training battalion which had quickly established a thin blocking line covering the obvious routes into Arnhem. Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion, which was advancing eastwards along the southernmost road into Arnhem, near the Rhine, found its route largely undefended. They arrived at the bridge in the evening and set up defensive positions at the north end. Two attempts to capture the arched steel bridge and its southern approach were unsuccessful. Of the other battalions, the 3rd had only covered half the distance to the bridge when they halted for the night, the rear of their column being under attack and needing time to catch up. The 1st Battalion was similarly fragmented, yet pushed on around the flank of the German line throughout the night. Frequent skirmishes resulted in their making little more progress.
Communication breakdown
Some loss of communication between the bridge and Divisional Headquarters in one of the drop zones was expected, because 13 km (8 miles) separated them and the main radio used throughout the Division was the Type 22 set designed to have an effective range of just 5 km (3 miles).28 However, the British radios did not function at any range; some had difficulty receiving signals from just a few hundred meters and others received nothing at all. Moreover it was found after landing that the radios had been pre-set to different frequencies, two of which coincided with those of German and British public broadcasting stations.28 Other theories have been advanced to explain the greatly reduced range of the 1st Airborne Division's radio sets. Modern tests using Type 22 sets have suggested that large deposits of iron in the soil could have been to blame.citation needed It is also possible that repeated operational stand-bys and cancellations (over a dozen drops were planned and then cancelled in the weeks prior to the operation) had led to sloppy battery charging procedures and lax supervision of this task. Thus communication between 1st Airborne units was poor while German defences were being coordinated and reinforced.
The only means of calling for close air support was through two special American units dropped with the 1st Airborne Division. These units were equipped with "Veeps": jeeps having Very High Frequency SCR-193 crystal sets. It was found impossible to communicate with aircraft on the higher of two frequencies allocated for this purpose, and the sets could not be tuned to the lower frequency.29 Despite efforts to re-tune them, the sets were soon destroyed by mortar fire, cutting the 1st Airborne's only possible link with RAF fighter-bombers. The pilots were under orders not to attack on their own initiative since from the air there was no easy way to distinguish friend from foe. Together with poor weather, this led to a critical lack of air support.
XXX Corps advance
On the morning of September 17 Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks was given confirmation that the operation was to take place that day.30 At 1230 hours Horrocks received a signal that the first wave of the airborne forces had left their bases within the United Kingdom and set the time for the ground attack to start at 1435 hours.30 At 1415 hours31 300 guns of the Corps artillery opened fire, firing a rolling barrage in front of XXX Corps start line3032 that was 1 mile (1.6 km) wide and 5 miles (8.0 km) in depth.33 The barrage was supported by seven squadrons of RAF Hawker Typhoons firing rockets at all known German positions along the road to Valkenswaard.3032
The advance was led by tanks and infantry of the Irish Guards30 and started on time when Lieutenant Keith Heathcote, commanding the lead tank, ordered his driver to advance.33 The lead units of the Irish Guards Group had broken out of XXX Corps bridgehead on the Meuse-Escaut canal and crossed into the Netherlands by 1500 hours.3033 After crossing the border the Irish Guards were ambushed by infantry and anti-tank guns dug in on both sides of the main road.3033 Portions of the artillery barrage was refired and fresh waves of Hawker Typhoons were called in.30 The Guardsmen moved forward to clear the German positions, manned by elements from two German parachute battalions and two battalions of the 9th SS Division30, and soon routed the German forces flanking the road.34 Interrogation of captured German soldiers led to some of them willingly,32 others after being threatened,35 pointing out the remaining German positions.3236 The fighting soon died down and the advance resumed. By last light the town of Valkenswaard had been reached and occupied the Irish Guards Group.373038
Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours, however they had only covered 7 miles (11 km). The operation was already starting to fall behind schedule.38 In Valkenswaard engineers were moved up to construct a 190 foot (58 m) Class 40 Bailey bridge over a stream, which was completed within 12 hours.37
German reactions
On the German side, it was soon clear what was happening. Field Marshal Walter Model was staying at the Tafelberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, a village to the west of Arnhem, when the British began to land in the countryside to the west of Oosterbeek. Initially confused, he concluded that they were commandos attempting to kidnap him. He made a mad dash for a safer location. Meanwhile, Wilhelm Bittrich, commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, had a clearer head and immediately sent a reconnaissance company of the 9th SS Panzer Division to Nijmegen to reinforce the bridge defence. By midnight, however, Model had gained a clear picture of the situation and issued orders that proved beneficial to the successful defence of Arnhem. The confusion usually attendant upon defending against airborne operations was absent at Arnhem, and the advantage of surprise was largely nullified by an alert reaction.
Day 2: Monday, 18 September
Allied weather forecasters correctly predicted that England would be covered in fog on the morning of September 18th. The Second Lift was postponed three hours as a result, and thick low clouds began to develop over the southern part of the battle zone that spread during the day over the entire area, hampering both resupply and air support missions. (Seven of the next eight days had poor weather, and all air operations were cancelled on September 22 and September 24.)
1st Airborne zone
The 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions pushed towards the Arnhem bridge during the early hours of 18 September and made good progress, but they were frequently halted in skirmishes as soon as it became light. With their long and unwieldy columns having to halt to beat off attacks whilst the troops in front carried on unaware, the Germans would delay segments of the two battalions, fragment them, and mop up the remnants.
Early in the day the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, sent south the day before, concluded it was not needed in Nijmegen and returned to Arnhem. Though aware of the British troops at the bridge, it attempted to cross by force and was beaten back with heavy losses, including its commanding officer, SS-Hauptsturmführer Paul Gräbner.
By the end of the day the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions had entered Arnhem, and were within 2 km (1 mile) of the bridge with approximately 200 men, one-sixth their original strength. Most of the officers and non-commissioned officers had been killed, wounded, or captured. The Second Lift, delayed by fog and jumping onto a landing zone under heavy attack, landed at full strength (the 4th Parachute Brigade, consisting of the 10th, 11th and 156th Battalions of the Parachute Regiment, commanded by Brigadier-General John Winthrop Hackett) and C and D Companies of the 2nd South Staffordshire Regiment.
82nd Airborne zone
Grave proved to be well defended, and German forces continued to press on the 82nd deployed on the Groesbeek heights to the east of Nijmegen. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended successfully against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen, and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks seized one of the Allied landing zones, where the Second Lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the LZ by 14:00, capturing 16 German flak pieces and 149 prisoners. Delayed by weather in Britain, the Second Lift did not arrive until 15:30. This lift brought in elements of the 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery battalions, the 456th Parachute Field Artillery battalion, and medical support elements. Twenty minutes later, 135 B-24 bombers dropped supplies from low level (100 ), 80% of which were recovered.
101st Airborne zone
Faced with the loss of the bridge at Son, the 101st unsuccessfully attempted to capture a similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best, finding the approach blocked. Other units continued moving to the south and eventually reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they were met by reconnaissance units from XXX Corps. At 16:00 they made radio contact with the main force to the south and told them about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey bridge to be brought forward. XXX Corps passed through Eindhoven and bivouacked south of Son, where they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the Bailey bridge.
At the end of two days the XXX Corps advance was behind schedule, and the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges were still in German hands.
Day 3: Tuesday, 19 September
Arnhem
During the early morning hours the 1st Parachute Brigade began its attack towards Arnhem Bridge with the 1st Battalion leading, supported by remnants of the 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd South Staffordshires on the 1st Battalion's left flank and the 11th Battalion following behind. As soon as it became light the 1st Battalion was spotted, and halted by fire from the main German defensive line. Trapped in open ground and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Battalion disintegrated and what remained of the 3rd Battalion fell back. The 2nd South Staffordshires were similarly cut off and, save for about 150 men, overcome by midday. The 11th Battalion, which had stayed out of much of the fighting, was now overwhelmed in exposed positions while attempting to capture high ground to the north. With no hope of breaking through, the 500 remaining men of these four battalions withdrew westwards in the direction of the main force, 5 km (3 miles) away in Oosterbeek.
The 2nd Battalion and attached units, by now amounting to approximately 600 men, were still in firm control of the northern approach ramp to the Arnhem bridge. The Germans recognised that they would not be moved by infantry attacks such as those that had been bloodily repulsed on the previous day, so instead they heavily shelled the short British perimeter with mortars, artillery, and tanks, systematically demolishing each house to enable their infantry to exploit gaps and dislodge the defenders. Although in constant, heavy battle against enormous odds, the British clung fiercely to their positions and the perimeter remained largely unaltered.
Oosterbeek
To the north of Oosterbeek the 4th Parachute Brigade led an attempt by the 1st Airborne Division to break through the German lines, but communication difficulties and significant enemy resistance caused the attack to fail with heavy losses. The Division, scattered far and wide and hard pressed by the enemy on all sides, had lost its offensive capability. Unable to help Lt.-Col. Frost at the bridge, the remaining soldiers attempted to withdraw into a defensive pocket at Oosterbeek and hold a bridgehead on the north bank of the Rhine.
The parachute elements of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade had remained in England because of dense fog. Their gliders, however, mainly carrying anti-tank guns and vehicles, were able to take off but had the misfortune to arrive above the landing zone just as the 4th Parachute Brigade was retreating across it, and the gliders came under fire from German units pursuing the Brigade.
Nijmegen
At 08:20, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment made contact with XXX Corps at Grave. This enabled the Regiment to move on to other missions and place the 3rd Battalion in division reserve. By the afternoon of 19 September, advance units of XXX Corps were arriving in Nijmegen. By this time, according to the original plan, they were due in Arnhem. A combined effort to take the Nijmegen bridge was mounted by two companies from the Guards Armoured Division and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The attack got within 400 meters (400 yards) of the bridge before being stopped; skirmishing continued throughout the night. A plan was developed to attack the south end of the bridge again while the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, planned to cross the river in boats 2 km (1 mile) downstream and then attack the north end. The boats, requested for late afternoon, never arrived. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge.
The 1st and 5th battalions, Coldstream Guards, were attached to the division. A resupply attempt by 35 C-47s (out of 60 sent) was unsuccessful; the supplies were dropped from a high altitude and could not be recovered. Bad weather over English bases prevented the scheduled major glider mission carrying the 325th Gilder Infantry Regiment from taking off, ending any hope for timely reinforcement for the 82nd Airborne.
Wijchen
At 09:50 the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was going forward to Wijchen, to attack the Edithbridge from its south end. The bridge was secured. After this fierce engagement they pushed on to the traffic bridge south of Wijchen. Another fierce engagement followed, and this bridge too was secured.
Eindhoven-Veghel
To their south, units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before were forced to yield to German counterattacks during the morning. British tanks arriving during the day helped push back the Germans by late afternoon. Later a small force of Panther tanks arrived at Son and started firing on the Bailey bridge. These too were beaten back by anti-tank guns that had recently landed, and the bridge was secured.
Day 4: Wednesday, 20 September
Arnhem bridge
Lt. Colonel John Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out and established communication via the public telephone system with 1st Division at around noon, to learn that the division had no hope of relieving them and that XXX Corps was stopped to the south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the afternoon the British positions around the north end of Arnhem bridge had weakened considerably. Casualties, mostly wounded, were high from constant shelling. An acute lack of ammunition, especially anti-tank munitions, enabled enemy armour to demolish British positions from point-blank range. Food, water, and medical supplies were scarce, and so many buildings were on fire and in such serious danger of collapse that a two-hour truce was arranged to evacuate the wounded (including Lieutenant-Colonel Frost) into German care and captivity. Frederick Gough took over as commander when Frost left.
The Germans overcame remaining pockets of resistance throughout the day, gaining control of the northern bridge approaches and permitting reinforcements to cross the span and reinforce units further south near Nijmegen. The remaining British troops continued to fight on fiercely, some with just fighting knives, but by early Thursday morning almost all had been taken prisoner. The last radio message broadcast from the bridge - "Out of ammo, God save the King" - was heard only by German radio intercept operators.
While it was estimated that the entire 1st Airborne Division, 10,000 strong, would only need to hold the Arnhem bridge for two days, in fact just 740 had held it for twice as long against far heavier opposition than anticipated. While 81 British soldiers died defending Arnhem bridge, German losses cannot be stated with any accuracy, though they were certainly extremely heavy; 11 units known to have participated in the fighting reported 50% casualties after the battle. In memory of the fighting there, the bridge has been renamed the "John Frost Bridge".
Oosterbeek
Further west, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division were gathering at Oosterbeek for their last stand; those already in place were not seriously challenged by the enemy throughout the day. To the east of the village, the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires were organised into a defensive position, and in desperate fighting later in the day they bloodily repulsed an enemy attack which threatened to cut the division off from the Rhine and so seal the fate of their fragile bridgehead.
In the woods to the west of Oosterbeek, the 4th Parachute Brigade was fighting its way towards the divisional perimeter but was under severe attack from German troops, supported by artillery, mortars, and tanks (some mounting flame-throwers). Their casualties were heavy; the 10th Battalion reached Oosterbeek in the early afternoon but with only 60 men.
Further in the rear, the 156th Parachute Battalion was being more hard pressed and was forced to fight off numerous enemy attacks before mounting counter-attacks of their own; indeed it is a credit to the battalion that they were so successful in these respects that the Germans did not know they were fighting men who were in full retreat. The battalion, down to 150 men, mounted a desperate bayonet charge to capture a hollow in the ground in the woods, in which they remained pinned by enemy attacks for the next eight hours. Towards the end of the day the 75 men who could, fixed bayonets and made a highly successful break through the German lines, and so retreated into the Allied pocket at Oosterbeek.
Nijmegen
Boats ordered by the 82nd Airborne the day before failed to arrive until afternoon, and a hasty daylight assault crossing was ordered. At about 15:00 the 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR, made the crossing in 26 canvas assault boats into well-defended positions. The American unit had no training on the British-made boats. A shortage of paddles required some troopers to paddle the craft with rifle butts. About half the boats survived the crossing under heavy fire; survivors then assaulted across 200 meters (200 yards) of open ground on the far bank and seized the north end of the bridge. German forces withdrew from both ends of the bridge, which was then rushed by Guards tanks and the 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR, securing the bridge after four days of struggle. The costly attack was nicknamed "Little Omaha" in reference to Omaha Beach.
To the east, German attacks on the heights made significant progress, capturing the only remaining bridge suitable for tanks. A counterattack at Mook by elements of the 505th PIR and 4th Battalion, the Coldstream Guards, forced the Germans back to their line of departure by 20:00. However, the 508th PIR lost ground at Im Thal and Legewald when attacked by German infantry and tanks. By now it was evident that the Germans' plan was to cut the highway, which would split up the Airborne units and cut off the advance elements of XXX Corps.
To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued. Eventually several Panther tanks managed to cut the roads, but pulled back when low on ammunition.
When Lieutenant-General Dempsey of the Second Army met Brigadier General Gavin, commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, he is reported to have said (in reference to the Nijmegen attack), "I am proud to meet the commander of the greatest Division in the world today."
Day 5: Thursday, 21 September
Oosterbeek
Approximately 3,584 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a bridgehead on the north side of the Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all sides. In the southeast the Lonsdale Force (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires) repulsed a major attack aided by the fire of the divisional light artillery. In the north the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers were almost overrun during the afternoon, but a counterattack with bayonets restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B" Company, 1st Battalion, Border Regiment, which controlled a vital area of high ground in the southwestern tip of the perimeter overlooking the Heveadorp ferry crossing at Driel, which was the division's only straightforward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was attacked by enemy armour and infantry, using captured French tanks equipped with flamethrowers, and the heights were lost. Counterattacks failed and the remnants of the company were redeployed. The division was left in a precarious position, controlling just 700 meters (700 yards) of the riverbank. The division refused to yield ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front.
A resupply attempt by RAF Stirlings of 38 Group was disrupted by the only effective Luftwaffe fighter interception during the entire operation. Fw 190s intercepted the Stirlings at low altitude and shot down 7 of one line of 10, and 15 overall. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 8 further losses. The Fw 190s were able to penetrate the screen of Allied fighters sent to cover the drop when one group, the U.S. 56th Fighter Group, was late in arriving in its patrol sector between Lochem and Deventer. The 56th, however, did redeem itself to an extent by shooting down 15 of the 22 Fw 190s as they departed the area.39
Polish paratroopers enter the battle
After two days of weather-related delay, the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade under Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski finally entered the battle on the afternoon of September 21, delivered at about 17:15 by 114 C-47s of the U.S. 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. Two of the brigade's three battalions were dropped amidst heavy German fire, opposite the 1st Airborne Division's position on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of Driel. Poor coordination by the RAF and persistent attacks by Luftwaffe aircraft caused their supplies to be dropped 15 km (9 miles) away, on the opposite side of the Rhine.
Planning to use the Heveadorp ferry to reinforce the division, they soon discovered that the opposite bank was dominated by the enemy and that the ferry was missing; it was later found downstream past the road bridge, unserviceable. Unable to help the British, the Polish withdrew to Driel for the night. The 1st Airborne Division made radio contact during the day with guns of the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps Artillery which had advanced with the ground forces and were assigned to provide the division with artillery support. Unlike many others, this radio link endured throughout the battle and the regiment provided valuable fire support to the division.
Nijmegen
Despite the capture of Nijmegen bridge and the clearing of the town on the previous evening, the Guards Armoured Division did not begin to advance until some 18 hours later, at noon. Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks claimed he needed this delay to sort out the confusion among his troops that had resulted from the battle in Nijmegen. This was a controversial decision that has been examined often in the years since. Half of the division had been detached to assist the 82nd Airborne Division elsewhere as the Germans sought to cut off the tip of the advance. The remainder of the Guards Armoured Division was short of fuel and exhausted from its difficult fight to secure Nijmegen. The Market/Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and resupply. This imposed a delay since other units could not be deployed on alternate routes to sustain the forward momentum. Brigadier General Gavin's diary comment was: "Had Ridgway been in command at that moment, we would have been ordered up that road in spite of all our difficulties, to save the men at Arnhem." 40 The historian Max Hastings wrote "It reflected poorly on the British Army...".
The delay enabled the Germans to considerably shore up their defences to the south of Arnhem, aided by use of the bridge following their capture of its northern end. The advance of the Guards, hindered by marshes that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm German defensive line. The Guards not having the strength to outflank it, the 43rd Division was ordered to take over the lead, work its way around the enemy positions and make contact with the Polish at Driel. However, the 43rd was 30 km (20 miles) away and there was a traffic jam between it and Nijmegen. It was not until the following day, Friday, that the whole division finally crossed the River Waal and began its advance.
The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand, continued their counterattacks all along the path of XXX Corps, although the Corps still managed to advance and the 101st Airborne Division continued to exploit its gains.
At about 15:00, 406 C-47 glider tugs and 33 C-47 cargo carriers executed a resupply mission for the 82nd Airborne Division. About 60% of the supplies were recovered (351 of the gliders were counted effective), partly with the help of Dutch civilians. Most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British armour units, were engaged in defensive missions with the objective of holding the highway corridor. Small attacks were fought all along the corridor.
Wijchen bridge
After the victory of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Wijchen the Germans tried to attack the Edithbridge from the north end. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment requested the 101st Airborne Division for help. Advancing directly, they couldn't get close enough to the Germans. It looked like another failure to secure the bridge. But the 101st then headed into Wijchen. Ultimately the Germans were not strong enough to